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Abstract This article explores an alternative model of local and regional economic 
development, specifically the rise of non-state ‘place-based’ economic development 
strategies. Illustrated through a case study of the Peel Group’s Atlantic Gateway Strategy in 
North West England, the article showcases the near-future potential for a growth in 
alternative place-based economic development strategies designed, orchestrated and 
implemented by non-state actors. In an era where both state and society find themselves 
increasingly reliant on non-state actors, in particular major private investment groups to 
deliver the future jobs, growth and regeneration of major urban regions, this article 
highlights a series of important concerns that the rise of non-state spatial strategies pose for 
place-based economic development interventions. 
 
Key words Non-state space; spatial strategy; place-based; business-state relations; 
economic development; Atlantic Gateway  
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THE RISE OF THE NON-STATE ‘PLACE-BASED’ 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
 
INTRODUCTION: WHAT CHANCE ALTERNATIVE PLACE-BASED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
STRATEGIES? 
This article confronts three aspects necessary in (re)appraising contemporary place-based 
economic development strategies: whether the 2008 financial and ensuing economic crisis 
can be viewed as a catalyst for fundamentally altering the orientation and implementation 
of economic development; how on-the-ground economic development strategies are being 
remodelled in response to the changing institutional landscape for implementing and 
delivering subnational economic and social policies; and perhaps most significant of all, are 
there suitable alternative(s to) place-based economic strategies (Pugalis & Bentley, this 
issue). The significance of this is not lost, in part, on Lord Heseltine, who when speaking to a 
UK House of Commons Select Committee inquiry argued: 
 
“If you sit round a table like this, you will find that you have got the chief executives 
of major companies … vice-chancellors of universities … people running the skills 
councils, and … people who run the local authorities, either politically or at executive 
level, and they are the people who are speaking for the local economy on a place-
based concept. They are talking about Manchester, Birmingham, Liverpool or 
wherever it may be. In the present system, if you look to see what sort of people 
make the decisions today, first of all, there is no place-based mechanism in central 
Government … If you think about it in personality terms and in functional and place 
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terms, I am arguing that we should create a local dynamic that is a big influence […] 
in designing how the local economies benefit from public support money.” (Lord 
Heseltine, quoted in House of Commons Business, Innovation and Skills Select 
Committee, 2013: Ev 11 emphasis added) 
 
As his evidence attests, the UK Government’s current governance model for subnational 
economic development in England – Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) – is promising, yet 
ultimately failing, to produce more locally attuned place-based economic development 
interventions. It should also not be lost on analysts that for Heseltine to argue for a new 
local dynamic to shape policy intervention is to simply restate the classic devolution demand 
for more say, more resource, and more autonomy over how localities and regions are 
governed. 
If a step is taken back from this, what can be seen is an attempt to work from within 
a long-established set of parameters, where decentralisation and devolution are 
orchestrated by the state, with the state’s own interests to the fore. Heseltine’s use of the 
word ‘we’ in the context of enabling local areas to produce more place-based economic 
development interventions is particularly significant and should not be overlooked, lest 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill’s (2003: 334) axiom on devolution be forgotten:  
 
“The complexity of the devolution process derives from the interest conflicts of the 
actors involved and the differences in legitimacy that they share. … Although 
national governments would prefer, ceteris paribus, to devolve responsibilities 
(authority) to their regional or state governments with as few accompanying 
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resources as possible, the subnational governments would prefer the opposite case. 
The balance between these extremes will depend upon the relative strength, or, in 
political terms, legitimacy, of the two tiers of government. 
 
The point here is that if the scope for place-based economic development strategies is to be 
appraised, this devolution conundrum must be recognised in any analysis. Post-Fordist, 
post-Keynesian, post-national capitalist territorial development can be characterised by 
periods of systematic governmentalised remappings of state space, with attempts to 
implement place-based economic development strategies constrained by the parameters of 
a ‘centrally-orchestrated’ approach to local and regional economic development; that is, the 
centre wants something different from the local (cf. Peck, 1995; Harrison, 2008). LEPs are 
but the latest in this saga.  
To explore these issues, the article first offers a critical appraisal of current 
approaches to place-based economic development strategies. Focusing on the current 
capabilities of LEPs and the role of private sector engagement in developing and 
implementing place-based economic development strategies, the second section then 
makes the case for considering alternatives to the prevailing orthodoxy of neoliberal state 
spatial restructuring and governmentalised remappings of state space. By this it is meant 
that there is the need to consider state-centrism and the constraints of the UK’s highly 
centralised system in order to contemplate genuinely alternative place-based economic 
development strategies. Illustrated through the case study of Peel’s Atlantic Gateway 
Strategy in North West England, in the third section, the article examines of the rise of what 
may be conceived of as an example of a new non-state place-based economic development 
strategy. It examines the motivations, tactics and strategies behind Peel’s involvement in 
6 | P a g e  
 
place-based economic development, as well as the mechanisms through which the 
orientation and implementation of economic development is being remodelled.  
The article concludes that on the evidence of what Peel’s Atlantic Gateway Strategy 
signifies, with the private sector taking the lead, this non state place-based strategy might 
be a valid alternative to state created place-based strategies. It may be that it is private 
investment, supported by the public sector, which will characterise the next decade of 
economic development. This increases the potential for more non-state (or certainly 
private-sector led) spatial strategies to emerge, raising important questions about the 
shifting relationship between public and private sector. The example of the Atlantic 
Gateway Strategy shows that while Peel has the money and power to have an increasingly 
significant say in place-based economic development, it is not a democratic institution and 
therefore cannot decide what type of place-based economic development is legitimated. 
 
CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF CURRENT APPROACHES TO PLACE-BASED ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES 
Although established as the flagship institution for the Cameron-led Government’s 
‘localist’ framework in England, LEPs have been constrained from the beginning. A product 
of the UK state’s latest remapping of state space LEPs lack legitimacy, resource, and are not 
the result of any significant autonomous local action. Lord Heseltine’s call for LEPs to be 
empowered is thus not surprising; this has been seen before in the case of the Regional 
Development Agencies and Training and Enterprise Councils (Jones, 2013). These 
institutions had no more power and were no more democratically accountable to localist 
interests than are the LEPs. The problem is that the parameters which see these institutions 
created as weak are the same ones which solutions put forward to strengthen them are 
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forced to work within. Lord Heseltine’s call for LEPs to be empowered with more resource, 
more power, and more say is a classic example of this. It presupposes LEPs are the answer. 
But what if LEPs are not the answer, as many critics argue; surely it is necessary to consider 
the alternatives? Even where LEPs are perceived to be the answer, as advocates would have 
it, it is necessary to be clear what question they are the answer to. 
What this suggests is that the rules of the game continue to be formulated by the 
central state, with everyone working to those rules. This is no more evident than in Lord 
Heseltine’s opinion that the solution for creating more place-based approach economic 
development interventions should come from within the state system itself – tasking 
existing officials from the top-down with new roles and remits (House of Commons BIS 
Select Committee, 2013). Operating in this way it is tempting to conclude that the power of 
this state-led approach is precisely that by closing down one alternative to state-led 
solutions and instituting another, it enables the state to protect its legitimacy in maintaining 
regulatory control and management of the economy. It is the classic devolution conundrum. 
This raises the question of whether it is possible to look beyond the confines of a tightly-
constructed state-centred discourse to consider whether genuine alternative(s to) place-
based economic development strategies exist. 
Whilst there remains undoubted interest and capacity to further develop state-
centred analyses, the key point of this article is consideration of the near-future potential 
for alternative(s to) place-based economic development strategies designed, orchestrated, 
and implemented by non-state actors. This approach is underscored by three primary 
considerations. First, institutions of the state are increasingly dependent on non-state actors 
to deliver the jobs, growth, and regeneration of the future. In part this is due to the crisis of 
economic development which has seen relative disinvestment in public infrastructure and 
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state subsidy (compared with the period of spatial Keynesianism and exacerbated by 
present day fiscal austerity). Allied to this, there are increasing demands on the state to 
make greater strategic investments to (1) reduce the public infrastructure deficit in an era 
when conforming to the discourse of global competitiveness by investing in economic, social 
and physical infrastructure is deemed essential to creating the localised conditions 
necessary to tap into trans-national circuits of globalised capital accumulation, and (2) 
stimulate the economy by bringing forward major infrastructure projects in this era of 
austerity. 
A second point is that there can be little doubt that place (still) matters in this regard. 
With a predominance of fixed infrastructural investments (e.g. transport networks, energy 
grids) and public service assets (e.g. schools, hospitals, fire stations) globalising cities have 
become key regulatory and investment spaces which private industry have set about 
controlling, managing and extracting value from. Seen from this perspective it might be 
expected that non-state actors would be taking a more active role in the economic 
development and regeneration process in these globalising cities; the article contends they 
are. A third point is that a literature is emerging which identifies the privatisation of urban 
and regional development and rise of new non-state spatial strategies as emerging trends in 
local and regional economic development (Knieling et al., 2012; Harrison, 2013). This 
suggests that is it possible to consider the near-future potential for alternative place-based 
economic development strategies designed, orchestrated, and implemented by non-state 
actors; in effect, the takeover of the development of economic strategy and implementation 
by the private sector. In fact, it may be that non-state actors are better able to deliver place-
based economic development strategies? The article turns to explore the issues further in 
looking at the rise of non-state spatial strategies. 
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BEYOND STATE-CENTRISM: EXAMINING THE RISE OF NON-STATE SPATIAL STRATEGIES 
Amid the globalisation of economic and political life much has been made of the trial-and-
error search for a new spatial/scalar fix to underpin the post-Fordist growth dynamic. The 
nature of state spatial strategies and the changes in institutional subnational structures of 
economic governance have come to reflect the fashionable discourses occupying academics, 
politicians, and policymakers. The UK (and especially England) is no exception to this; since 
1997, the discursive frame has shifted from regions (1997-2004), through cities and regions 
(2004-2010), to arrive at localism (2010-present). This political praxis has seen the 
decentralisation of tasks and responsibilities to various subnational institutional frameworks 
which critics argue has been little more than a ‘firework display’ (Harrison, 2012). This sees a 
new initiative launched with a crescendo of noise, sparkle for a short time, only to fizzle out 
and disappear from sight. The result is a subnational economic development landscape 
scarred by the ‘corpses’ of earlier institutions (Bentley and Pugalis, 2013) – a fate likely to be 
suffered by the LEPs, the latest fashionable institution, and any future decentralised 
institution that is constructed to this specification (Gash et al., 2014). 
 
Capabilities of LEPs  
Many commentators – both academic and non-academic – see LEPs as an “empty policy” 
(Jackson et al., 2013, p. 27) which is “destined for oblivion” (Walker, 2012). But while it 
would be wrong to say that all commentators feel as strongly, given England’s affection for 
perpetual restructuring the question appears not if, but when, LEPs will be abolished (Ward 
and Hardy, 2013). The problem, as alluded to above, is the rules of the game and the 
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contradictions inherent in state-led place-based economic development. Despite being 
charged with spearheading the Coalition Government’s localist approach to economic 
development, these contradictions include: many of the powers (particularly around 
business support) being re-centralised in the transition from RDAs to LEPs, ensuring LEPs are 
less governmentalised than their predecessors; a localist framework where the central state 
actually determines their priorities and practices (both in the parameters they set when 
requiring approval of key decisions by Ministers and the conditions/incentives 
accompanying government funding); LEPs had a brief to operate across functional economic 
areas yet they have been defined by territorial politics; and where central government’s 
piecemeal approach to furnishing LEPs with resource and power ensured the majority spent 
their fledgling years fighting for more resources, rather than delivering on economic 
development objectives. 
The LEPs have also been roundly criticised – both as institution and policy initiative – 
for not enabling significant business and community/society involvement in the process. 
Local accountability or the lack thereof is significant to the Peel case study, particularly given 
the focus on community-led local development from the European Commission for the 
2014-2020 programming period, but business involvement is the main focus here because it 
is business needs which are driving considerations for conceptualising the ‘non-state’ place-
based strategy.  
 
Private sector engagement 
Evaluating the LEP bids, SQW (2010: 6) argues that business involvement was “in general, 
thin” and  “unsurprising given the difficulty of marshalling the business community to 
engage in a process that – from their perspective – could have seemed abstract and of no 
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immediate consequence”. Little improvement appears to have been made over the past 
two-years. Recent analysis by the Work Foundation suggests the ‘clock is ticking’ on 
business involvement, with many business leaders “ready to walk” away if their LEP does 
not start producing tangible gains in the very near future (Cominetti et al., 2012: 1).  
This is a view reinforced by Syrett and Bertotti who, when reconsidering private 
sector engagement in subnational economic governance, conclude that a limited 
understanding of private sector engagement means LEPs “provide a fundamentally flawed 
governance model for addressing the practical realities of pursuing subnational economic 
development across differentially constituted economic and political urban and regional 
contexts” (2012: 2312).  All three articles point out how the problem is rooted in the terms 
which the state sets out for private sector engagement in subnational economic 
development. In short, there is a clear disconnect between the scripted role for business 
involvement and their actual performance in subnational economic development (Wood, 
2004).  
This poses searching questions about the prospect for existing place-based economic 
development strategies to realise socioeconomic goals. But it also prompts consideration of 
the importance of (re)interpreting business-state relations in the context of subnational 
economic governance. For identifying the weakness of business involvement is only the first 
part of the equation. The more substantive part is to identify ways of aligning the interests 
of business and society within state-led models, or if this is not possible, to seek an 
alternative model. Syrett and Bertotti (2012: 2313) provide the context for this: 
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“Whilst state-centred analyses provide insights into the changing terrain which 
provides enhanced possibilities for private sector engagement, they have proved 
largely unable to explore why businesses actually choose to engage (or not) in urban 
governance, the mechanisms by which actors are engaged, and how the nature of 
engagement is played out to impact upon the evolution of practice.” 
 
With this as a starting point, the authors proceed with an in-depth longitudinal analysis of 
the implementation of the City Growth Strategy, one of the previous Labour Government’s 
policy initiatives most committed to placing the private sector at the centre of designing and 
implementing public policy interventions in urban and regional development. A most 
revealing observation is that: 
  
“despite initial business interest generated by high-profile launch events, it quickly 
became apparent to the majority of businesses that the City Growth Strategy 
provided little in the way of immediate business opportunities.” (Syrett and Bertotti, 
2012: 2318) 
 
This has all the hallmarks of the ‘firework’ metaphor. Yet it points also towards what is fast 
becoming a critical body of literature examining the tactics, motives and strategies for 
business (dis)engagement in subnational economic governance.  
 At the root of investigations into business-state relations in subnational economic 
development practices are a series of key questions: What is the motivation for business to 
get involved in subnational economic governance? How does business involvement unfold 
in different spatial and temporal contexts? What are the consequences and impacts of 
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business involvement on economic development? What tactics and strategies do business 
leaders use as part of this process?1 Emerging from this critical body of work is a strong 
sense of divergence in the public and private discourses, approaches, interests, perceptions, 
strategies and preferences that businesses invoke for their involvement and role in 
subnational policy. One of the most revealing insights is the move away from earlier 
explanations, where it was routinely assumed that political engagement was exclusively 
determined by a strong market rationale that saw businesses only interested in preserving 
and pursuing material self-interest (see Cox and Mair, 1989), to an appreciation of the wider 
corporate social and ethical responsibilities, objectives, and motivations of business (Wood, 
2004; Syrett and Bertotti, 2012).  
This change is certainly evident in analysis of business engagement in LEPs, where 
material self-interest is seen by almost all business leaders as a ‘secondary motivation’ given 
very few report receiving any direct benefit to their business as a result of their involvement 
with LEPs (Cominetti et al., 2012). A desire to support the local area, alongside networking 
opportunities, access to information, and prestige, are all seen as more significant 
motivating factors. Similarly, Syrett and Bertotti (2012) record how, contrary to the scripted 
role for business in subnational policy, private sector engagement in the City Growth 
Strategy was predominantly rooted within ‘nonmarket’ rationales of public service, 
corporate social responsibility, and urban politics. Yet what is perhaps most revealing is 
what they deduce from this: 
 
“A model of stripped-down local government with private sector contractors as 
‘strategic partners’ potentially provides business a lead role in local economic 
development largely unfettered by some of the traditional requirements of 
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democratic accountability, transparency, and scrutiny.” (Syrett and Bertotti, 2012: 
2323) 
 
What is striking about this outcome is the proposed solution remains state-centred. It is 
about reworking the balance of the current system, a compromise that aims to move the 
balance slightly more in favour of business vis-a-vis the local state in enacting a lead role in 
place-based economic development. This is one of many examples, it can be argued, that 
demonstrate the difficulty in looking beyond the confines of a tightly-constructed state-
centred discourse to consider whether genuine alternative(s to) place-based economic 
development strategies exist. Providing further illustration of the power bound-up within 
state-led approaches, it is also perhaps why the authors are only prepared to commit to the 
‘potential’ of their proposed solution in assigning business a lead role in place-based 
economic development? As with many aspirational communiques relating to place-based 
economic development it appears to be a statement made in hope rather than expectation. 
 One of the most striking features about work on business-state relations in economic 
development is how little or no mention is made of businesses themselves. Reference is 
made to business, not businesses. Names of firms are noticeable only in their absence. The 
result is a somewhat abstract analysis of how business involvement in UK subnational 
economic development has evolved post-devolution. Useful in identifying some of the 
broader trends, themes, and issues, what this approach fails to do is adequately address the 
specifics of engagement in the economic development process. Missing from the debate are 
those deep-rooted analyses of actual businesses, particularly those which are actively 
seeking to take a lead role in subnational economic development. In short, there appears to 
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have been little critical thought applied to the firm within current initiatives to engender 
private-sector led place-based economic development. 
 
Alternatives to the prevailing orthodoxy of neoliberal state spatial restructuring: the case 
for private sector led ‘place-based’ economic development 
It goes without saying that firm-centred analyses pose methodological challenges for social 
science researchers, though these are not insurmountable.2 Knieling et al. (2012) for 
instance have recently provided four examples of specific firms and their strategies to 
influence spatial development in Germany. Illustrating what they see as the privatisation of 
urban and regional development, the examples include Siemens in Erlangen, BASF in Rhine-
Neckar, Volkswagen in Wolfsburg, and a consortium of companies led by the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in Cologne to manage the design of the 2008 Cologne Downtown 
Masterplan. Showcasing examples where firms are taking a lead role in place-based 
economic development, Knieling et al.’s deeper rooted analysis is noteworthy in the way it 
not only narrates the individual motivations for the engagement of each firm, but the 
manner in which it reveals non-state actors becoming increasingly active on the city-wide or 
city-regional level, and in policy spheres which do not always map onto the corporate 
interests of the business. As they observe: 
 
“the engagement of private sector actors in the design of public spaces is nothing 
new, however, they seem to be making strategic decisions not only related to their 
own business segment. Rather, they have a much larger area of influence relative to 
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the object (topic-crossing) and the spatial cut (city regional) in view.” (Knieling et al., 
2012:  452 trans.) 
   
Yet for all Knieling et al. reveal in terms of the motivations for companies to engage, one 
aspect not addressed are the actual mechanisms these individual companies use to 
influence place-based economic development. A missing piece of the jigsaw is the tactics 
and strategies employed by companies to defend, and enable certain essential interests to 
be realised. Uncovering the actual mechanisms, that is, the terms of cooperation and how 
the encounters between the actors involved are structured, enables the determination of 
what is possible and, crucially, whether a firm (or firms) taking the lead role in place-based 
economic development offers a genuine alternative to the traditional state-led model. To 
this end, the remainder of the article examines the tactics and strategies employed by the 
Peel Group, a private investment group which is taking the lead role in developing an 
alternative place-based economic development strategy for England’s North West region. 
 
PEEL’S ATLANTIC GATEWAY STRATEGY: A NEW FORM OF ‘PLACE-BASED’ ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT? 
Launched on 5 September 2008, the Ocean Gateway – later renamed Atlantic Gateway – is a 
private sector vision and strategy for establishing England’s North West region as an 
internationally significant investment opportunity and to capitalise on its economic 
potential to be a globally competitive major urban region3. Led by the ‘Peel Group’ 
(hereafter Peel) the Atlantic Gateway is a region, a concept, an investment strategy, an 
ambition, and a strategic plan: 
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• The Atlantic Gateway region is a 50-kilometre urban corridor connecting the Port of 
Liverpool in the heart of the Liverpool city-region to the centre of the Greater 
Manchester city-region along the historic Manchester Ship Canal.  
• The Atlantic Gateway concept is a private sector vision for how strategic 
infrastructural investment can unlock the economic development potential of the 
area and enable it to become a major driver of national and international economic 
development and growth. 
• The Atlantic Gateway investment strategy centres on Peel’s proposed £50 billion 
investment programme in 50 of its most significant projects up to 2050, allied to 
local public sector support, presenting a compelling co-investment opportunity to UK 
Government. 
• The Atlantic Gateway has the ambition to rebalance the UK in a way that regional 
policy has failed, ensuring the area is a net contributor to national wealth rather 
than a net recipient of redistributive state aid. 
• The Atlantic Gateway is fast becoming a strategic plan, with its own Partnership 
Board overseeing its progress and delivery. 
Peel’s modus operandi is to put forward its ideas for how to drive transformational change 
and opportunity in the Atlantic Gateway region. In the first 5-years it has evolved and 
developed the support of others such that it now constitutes a broad, increasingly 
formalised, public and private sector growth coalition uniting to countenance the Atlantic 
Gateway concept, deliver the necessary investment, and drive forward the economic 
regeneration of the Atlantic Gateway area. But the questions are: what motivated Peel to 
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take on this leadership role, and crucially, how did the tactics and strategies they employ 
influence the nature and direction of economic development? 
 
From deliverer to strategic leaders 
Peel’s raison d'être is delivering flagship property-led developments. Beginning in the 1970s 
Peel’s modus operandi has traditionally involved acquiring land and property (cheaply, often 
in former industrial areas where other investors would not consider it to be an investment 
opportunity), developing it, and generating returns on their investment through rent, public 
and/or private investment (which pushes up the value of the Peel-owned assets), or onward 
selling. This business approach has seen Peel deliver two flagship developments in 
Manchester, the Trafford Centre, a 2 million sq ft retail space, and MediaCityUK, the largest 
purpose-built media community in Europe in which Peel has so far invested approximately 
£650 million.  
After 25 years of investing in the Atlantic Gateway area, Peel has since taken to 
engaging in other sectors and across a wider spatial geography. Listed on the London Stock 
Exchange since 1983, Peel was re-privatised in 2004 as their ambitions saw them quickly 
expand and develop businesses in other sectors beyond Peel Land & Property such that the 
Peel Group now encompasses Peel Advertising, Peel Airports, Peel Energy, Peel 
Environmental, Peel Leisure, Peel Media, Peel Ports and Peel Waters. Alongside this Peel 
have acquired significant equity stakes in other major international companies, either 
through onward selling (such as the 2010 sale of 65% of Peel Airports to the Vantage Airport 
Group, owners of 11 airports worldwide, or the sale of the Trafford Centre for a 20% stake 
in Intu Properties, owners or part-owners of 16 UK shopping centres with investments 
valued at £7 billion) or buying up shares (such as acquiring a 71% controlling  interest in 
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Pinewood Shepperton Studios in 2011). It was in the midst of developing this rapidly 
expanded portfolio of businesses that Peel embarked on Ocean Gateway. 
Through Peel’s ownership or control of key assets (land, property, infrastructure, 
utilities) and diffusion into a myriad of economic sectors, Ocean Gateway demonstrates the 
increasingly dominant influence Peel have over the determinants of economic development 
in North West England. More significantly, Ocean Gateway unveiled Peel’s ambitious long-
term plans to capitalise on this dominant influence by moving beyond their trademark of 
delivering large-scale individual flagship developments to taking the lead in the design and 
delivery of a major, long-term, co-ordinated cross-sector investment strategy across an area 
– the Atlantic Gateway – with a 6 million resident population and an economy that 
contributes in excess of £50 billion (ca. 6%) annually to the UK economy.  
The significance of the Atlantic Gateway Strategy becomes most evident when 
compared to recent state-led place-based economic development initiatives, most notably 
LEPs. What is striking is that on many of the points LEPs have been criticised (as noted 
above), the Peel-led Atlantic Gateway appears to represent a genuine alternative place-
based economic strategy worthy of consideration. Indicative of this is how: the Atlantic 
Gateway area is defined by economic priorities, not territorial politics; it has the critical 
mass to be considered a nationally and internationally significant agglomeration economy; 
Peel’s proposed £50 billion investment into projects in the Atlantic Gateway by 2050 
(including £14 billion of new investment by 2030) suggests it is well-resourced, with flagship 
schemes involving hundreds of millions – even billions – pounds worth of investment and 
anticipated returns; and, it is genuinely business-led, by Peel in the first instance and now by 
the Atlantic Gateway Partnership Board. The magnitude of Atlantic Gateway is not lost on, 
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among others, Lord Heseltine, who in an independent report commissioned by the Prime 
Minister, declared:  
 
“If anywhere in the UK can develop the critical mass and momentum to become an 
alternative growth pole to London, it is the Atlantic Gateway … [T]here has never 
been a credible proposition of that nature in Britain to achieve something decades of 
regional policy failed to achieve’.” (Heseltine and Leahy, 2011: 56-57) 
 
This all points towards the Atlantic Gateway offering a potentially novel approach to place-
based economic development, and is one which could stimulate new thinking and provide 
an alternative framework for realising the socio-economic goals of local and regional 
development. But it also prompts the need to consider other issues, such as the orientation, 
merits and dilemmas posed by such an alternative framework. Perhaps most important, the 
question is: Is it simply replacing one centralised system (state-centralism) with another 
(Peel-centrism)? To answer this and other related questions it is necessary to examine the 
tactics and strategies employed by Peel in devising, developing, and delivering Atlantic 
Gateway. 
 
Tactics and strategies 
When considering the emergence of new, alternative, or novel place-based economic 
development strategies it is important to ask by whom, for whom, they are being 
constructed, and why now? In the case of Ocean Gateway these questions are fairly 
straightforward to answer. John Whitaker, Chairman of Peel, made no secret at the launch 
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event of Ocean Gateway that he saw it as a mechanism to both enable, and accelerate, 
Peel’s delivery of major infrastructure, development and regeneration schemes: 
 
“Ocean Gateway should have its own planning regime led by the regional 
development agency and the local authorities so we can overcome individual local 
authority objections.” (quoted in Barry, 2008: n.p.)  
 
Despite Peel’s success in delivering flagship developments, the company remains indignant 
towards the planning permission process following the long-running battle to secure 
approval for the Trafford Centre. First proposed in 1986, when Peel acquired the 
Manchester Ship Canal Company and the land on which the out-of-town shopping centre 
would eventually be built, it was not until 1995 that the development finally gained 
approval, after one of the most protracted and expensive planning decisions in UK history. 
Peel’s ambitious plans for large scale co-ordinated investments, involving more complex 
schemes across a wider geography, raise the stakes in terms of the potential gains but also 
the potential complexity of securing the necessary planning approvals. Keen to avoid 
becoming embroiled in similarly long-running planning approval decisions, Ocean Gateway 
was Peel reaching out – most notably to the Northwest Development Agency (NWDA) which 
had statutory responsibility for developing and delivering the Regional Economic Strategy 
(RES) – to secure support for the concept and, by implication, Peel’s corporate expansion 
into different economic sectors and with a wider spatial reach.  
 Peel’s relationship with the NWDA was itself significant prior to the launch of Ocean 
Gateway, with Peel the developer responsible for delivering a number of the agency’s key 
projects. It was a relationship that grew stronger around the time Ocean Gateway was 
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launched, when Robert Hough, Chair of Peel Airports (1997-2009) and Deputy Chair of Peel, 
first became a Board Member (2007) and then Chair (2009) of the NWDA (while retaining a 
non-Executive Director role with Peel), with Bryan Grey, the outgoing Chair of NWDA, 
becoming Chair of Peel Media. This close relationship is significant because Peel saw the 
NWDA, particularly the statutory responsibility it had for agreeing the RES, as the 
mechanism to enable their expansionist plans to proceed apace. In effect, the NWDA would 
become the strategic planning authority to enable Peel to deliver Ocean Gateway. A year 
before Ocean Gateway was officially launched Peel’s relationship with the NWDA was to 
take on even greater significance when the then Labour government announced it was 
transferring the statutory responsibility for regional spatial planning to the regional 
development agencies as part of plans to abolish Regional Assemblies and develop single 
integrated regional strategies. 
 The NWDA rebranded Ocean Gateway as Atlantic Gateway, a move that saw the 
Atlantic Gateway remain close to the original Peel concept of Ocean Gateway but carefully 
crafted from being a solely Peel initiative to one which included sites and assets located in 
the area under consideration but not in Peel’s ownership (e.g. Daresbury Science Park). 
Alongside this, the spatial framing changed from Ocean Gateway’s singular focus on the idea 
of an urban growth corridor connecting Liverpool and Manchester to the Atlantic Gateway 
which is depicted as an amalgamation of two spatial constructs – the Liverpool and 
Manchester ‘city-regions’ plus the original Ocean Gateway ‘corridor’. This was also to be 
reflected in the title of the strategy as it changed from Atlantic Gateway – Framework for a 
Global Growth Opportunity in January 2010 to Atlantic Gateway – Accelerating Growth 
across the Manchester and Liverpool City Regions: Framework for a Global Growth 
Opportunity, by February 2010. More than simple semantics, this change reflected non-
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trivial recalibrations to the design of Atlantic Gateway and demonstrated the degree of 
political manoeuvring Peel had to engage in to secure support for the concept.  
The main obstacle Peel faced was the hostile reaction of Manchester City Council. A 
dispute dating back to Manchester City Council’s opposition, first, to Peel’s Trafford Centre 
development (for fear that it would divert investment and revenue away from city-centre 
retailers), and second, to Peel’s partnering with Manchester’s neighbouring local authority 
Salford in a rival – and ultimately successful – bid for MediaCityUk to be located in Salford 
Quays, the Atlantic (Ocean) Gateway proposals re-ignited this latent tension between Peel 
and Manchester City Council. The city council saw Atlantic (Ocean) Gateway as diverting 
attention away from their city-region, in particular Peel’s plans to exploit housing and 
employment land opportunities in the corridor between the Liverpool and Manchester city-
regions (Manchester City Council, 2010a, 2010b). Using the NWDA to broker support for the 
concept, the plans for housing sites was removed and the emphasis put on Peel’s Ocean 
Gateway spatial concept prioritising growth along the corridor was downgraded such that it 
was presented as supporting, rather than rivalling, growth in the city-region. 
Still intrinsically Peel’s original concept, Atlantic Gateway was officially launched by 
the NWDA in March 2010, five months before the first North West Integrated Regional 
Strategy (RS2010) was published. The timing is significant because at the time of the launch, 
the NWDA were consulting on the key spatial priorities for RS2010. When RS2010 was 
published Peel’s strategy had paid dividends – they had secured statutory support for the 
Atlantic Gateway since the NWDA listed Manchester city-region, Liverpool city-region, and 
the Atlantic Gateway as the key ‘priorities for places’ from a North West regional 
perspective (NWDA, 2010a). Nevertheless, Peel failed to secure the NWDA becoming 
planning authority for Atlantic Gateway because no sooner had the scheme been recognised 
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in RS2010 than the newly formed Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 
announced the abolition of Regional Development Agencies and the creation of LEPs. 
If the LEP process appeared abstract and of no immediate consequence to other 
businesses, this was certainly not true for Peel. Invited to submit outline proposals, setting 
out how they would work with government to strengthen local economies, the Coalition 
Government gave local authority leaders and business leaders just 69 days to design the 
new institutional architecture for a new era of subnational economic development in 
England. In the Atlantic Gateway area, while the three subregional areas – Manchester city-
region, Liverpool city-region, and Cheshire & Warrington – each submitted their outline 
proposals, Peel had been working on developing their own proposal for an Atlantic Gateway 
LEP. Badged as a “private sector-led special purpose LEP” which could “complement the 
other LEPs” (Peel, 2010: ii) Peel’s new strategy was to secure backing for their investment 
plans directly from central government.  
This new tactic was forced upon Peel; having lost their main ally their political 
bargaining power was weakened. Nonetheless, Peel’s response to the LEP proposals did 
avail them some negotiating power in the North West. Initially courting controversy for not 
engaging local authorities in their plans, a Regional Leaders Forum was convened for 7 
September 2010 (the day after the Government deadline for outline LEP proposals to be 
submitted) to discuss Peel’s proposal. Without direct support from local authorities, Peel 
withdrew its LEP bid, following representation at the meeting by regional stakeholders – 
including the local authorities. Instead, it was agreed that an inclusive, partnership-based 
Atlantic Gateway Board – including one local authority representative from each LEP – 
would be established to secure strategic alignment with the 3 LEPs, to deliver the strongest 
level of partnership buy-in, and to develop and deliver Atlantic Gateway. A much less 
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powerful resolution than Peel were initially pursuing, that they were still able to advance 
the Atlantic Gateway in the right strategic direction post-RDAs is testament to the inherent 
political power their land holdings and ownership of assets affords them in the North West. 
If the transition from RDAs to LEPs saw Atlantic Gateway lose some of its impetus 
regionally, the change in national government presented a series of counter opportunities 
to advance apace the development of Atlantic Gateway. First, the formation of 
Conservative-led coalition government allied to programmes of fiscal austerity had led to 
wide-ranging cuts in the public sector and greater emphasis placed on business leading on 
the delivery of jobs, growth and regeneration, as well as on the provision of services 
previously delivered by the state. Second, the model of economic growth pursued by the 
Cameron-led government aspires to reduce the deficit and rebalance the economy (both 
geographically and by sector). Third, reform of the public bodies landscape – such as the 
removal of RDAs – is designed, in part, to enable a better dialogue between business and 
government and to facilitate greater business-engagement in informing public policy and 
shaping policy interventions (Cabinet Office, 2010). And fourth, responding to pressure from 
business groups and international organisations, notably the IMF, to bring infrastructure 
investments forward to offset planned austerity and to act as an immediate stimulus for 
economic growth, the UK Government has increased investment in infrastructure and more 
broadly infrastructure-led economic regeneration.  
It can be argued that Atlantic Gateway is a proposition likely, therefore, to gain more 
favour in the corridors of Westminster and Whitehall. Indeed, and this is critical, because 
Atlantic Gateway’s success relies on co-investment, particularly from HM Government, 
because for all Peel’s landholdings, assets and sector involvement, the connecting 
infrastructure (e.g. road, rail links) that is so central to unlocking the growth potential in the 
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Atlantic Gateway area remain beyond the direct control of Peel or the other public-private 
partners. It can be seen that the current tactic and strategy being employed is to gain public 
sector investment in infrastructure to complement the Atlantic Gateway development, and 
it is one that is arguably producing some dividends4. 
 
CONCLUSION: IS THERE A ROLE FOR NON-STATE ‘PLACE-BASED’ ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY? 
According to Fabrizio Barca, author of the highly influential report for the European 
Commission on the reform of EU cohesion policy, “the ‘place-based’ approach is the ‘new 
paradigm' of regional policy” (Barca, 2009: xi; see also OECD, 2009). Yet as this article has 
sought to reveal, it may be a very different type of place-based approach that determines 
local and regional development in the future. It can be argued that although the Atlantic 
Gateway might be somewhat unique (owing to the spatial proximity of Peel’s landholdings 
and assets), the processes underpinning it are arguably not unique to Peel and North West 
England. This is being recognised by those internal to the Atlantic Gateway, such as Steven 
Broomhead (former NWDA Chief Executive and current advisor to the Atlantic Gateway 
Partnership Board): 
“We all know the public purse is going to be constrained – it will be private 
investment which will characterise the next decade.” (NWDA, 2010b: 1) 
 
It is also recognised by those external to the Atlantic Gateway: 
 
 “Fundamentally, the era of predominantly public finance investment in 
infrastructure is over and thus regeneration programmes will have to adapt to this 
new environment.” (Howell, 2012: 5) 
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The argument being put forward in this article is that the rise of the non-state spatial 
strategy may well become the norm and a potentially soon to be dominant feature of place-
based economic development. Here in this article, the Atlantic Gateway, an entirely private-
sector led strategic development initiative, is presented as a looking glass onto this 
potentially new, alternative and novel approach to the design, development and delivery of 
place-based economic development strategies. In addition to this, two points are worthy of 
particular emphasis. 
 First, by focusing on the business involved as opposed to business involvement per 
se, it has been demonstrated that while Peel’s motivation for engaging in the design and 
development of a place-based economic development strategy has remained largely 
unchanged over time, the tactics and strategies required to defend, enable certain essential 
interests to be realised have had to evolve. Alongside this, Peel’s capacity to “bargain out” 
(Stone, 1989) and renegotiate the terms of cooperation so that the strategic priorities of 
other local, regional and national groups become increasingly aligned to their corporate 
interests serves to draw particular attention to ideas of power in the practice of economic 
development. On this, it is particularly interesting to consider the view of Susan Williams, 
Executive Director of Atlantic Gateway: 
 
“We don’t have power as such because we are not a bureaucratic organ. But we do 
have the ability to change the whole of the North West – our power lies in 
investment, the way we get people working together, the power in getting things 
done.” (quoted in Morgan, 2012: 6) 
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Atlantic Gateway and other private-sector led initiatives of this type may not have pure 
power but they do have the “power to” (Stone, 1989) influence, align and shape the future 
direction of economic development, particularly at the local and regional level. Democratic 
institutions do still retain power to decide what type of place-based economic development 
is legitimated and for whose benefit, but the question this article raises is for how long this 
can be sustained when private investment is becoming the only way economic development 
and regeneration can take place and local accountability structures are being undermined 
by austerity and longstanding failures to successfully devolve political power in England. 
The second and related point appertains to the status of place-based economic 
development strategies in England – specifically LEPs. In their recent edited collection, 
Where next for Local Enterprise Partnerships? Ward and Hardy (2013: 9) are led to conclude 
that “we need LEPs with larger areas, proper funding for running costs, experienced staff, 
and access to capital”. Perhaps in looking at Atlantic Gateway, and other potential private-
sector led initiatives of this type, it can be seen that they represent many of things a LEP 
should be … and in the case of Atlantic Gateway, the LEP that never was. 
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Endnotes 
1. It goes without saying that businesses believe they should play a significant role in 
economic development; indeed the need for business involvement in economic 
development has over recent decades become a hegemonic discourse within public 
policy-making circles. 
2. There is not the space to go into these in detail other than to say firm-centred analyses 
clearly raise the potential for researcher issues for dealing with corporate confidentiality, 
the nature of private firm information (e.g. access and dissemination of information 
about motivations, situations, business planning and so on), and potential conflicts of 
interest between researcher and private firm. 
3. This section draws on empirical research conducted by the author during 2013. This took 
the form of both desktop research and semi-structured interviews (25) with inter alia 
Atlantic Gateway board members (both public and private), local authority officials, 
government departments, businesses and business representatives. 
4. There is some evidence to support this - for example, the Cameron-led government has 
established a cluster of 3 enterprise zones in the Atlantic Gateway area (the largest of 
which is a Peel site), confirmed the £560m Northern Hub rail improvement scheme will 
be funded in full, approved Peel’s £5.5bn Liverpool Waters regeneration schemes 
despite strong calls for a public inquiry, and provided a £35m grant to enable work on 
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Peel Ports new £300m Liverpool 2 container terminal to begin – but how much of this 
can be attributed directly to Atlantic Gateway remains contested. 
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